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State v. Riker, Battered Women Under Duress: The




Domestic violence does not discriminate. It strikes with equal
force to all victims. There is no typical battered woman. She is a
neighbor, a friend, a co-worker, a boss, a sister, a child, a mother.
With statistics evidencing that a woman is beaten every eighteen
seconds,1 it is difficult for one to ignore this issue.
Fortunately, society is becoming increasingly aware of the
domestic violence problem in America. Since 1979, courts have held
that expert testimony regarding the existence of the battered woman
syndrome (BWS) is admissible.2 Through these judicial decisions and
legislative action,3 many battered women are now allowed to present
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1. Note, Developments in the Law - Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1501, 1501 (1993) (citing Donna Moore, Editor's Introduction: An Overview of the Problem in
BATTERED WOMEN 7, 14 (Donna Moore ed., 1979)). Some reports indicate that there are as
many as four million domestic violence incidents against women each year. Id. at 1501 (citing
Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
117 (1990) (testimony of Angela Browne, Ph.D.)).
2. People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 337 n.8 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing cases), rev'd on
other grounds, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994).
3. Section 1107 of the California Evidence Code provides for the admission of BWS evidence
in criminal actions. Section 1107(a) provides:
In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the prosecution or the
defense regarding battered women's syndrome, including the physical, emotional, or
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evidence of the BWS to support a defense to criminal acts related to
their batterers. Unfortunately, not all battered women defendants are
allowed to introduce BWS testimony to support their defenses.
Deborah Riker is one of the battered women to whom the Supreme
Court of Washington chose to deny this opportunity.4
Although some people have the option of going to the police after
receiving threats on their lives, this was not the case for Deborah
Riker: Deborah is a battered woman.' Since age nine, Deborah
suffered repeated torture and abuse at the hands of men who were in
her life.6 In 1987, Deborah met Rupert Burke, a man who abused
both women and drugs.' When Burke threatened both Deborah and
her sister, Deborah did what he told her to do: she soldhim cocaine.'
As a result, Deborah was charged with delivery and possession of
cocaine.' Deborah's case presented the classic defense of duress, but
she was not allowed to introduce evidence to adequately support this
defense.10 Although Washington courts admit BWS testimony in
cases where a battered woman's state of mind is at issue, in State v.
Riker," the Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
refusal to admit this evidence to support Deborah's defense of
duress.12
This Note argues that prior Washington case law, current
literature on the BWS, and proper application of evidence rules with
mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence,
except when offered against a criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or
acts of abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107(a) (West 1995).
4. State v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994).
5. Battered women are similar to trauma victims and develop learned responses to repeated
abuse. Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 326 (1992). In particular, battered women experience a sense of
powerlessness to do anything to stop the violence. See State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 596-97,
682 P.2d 312, 315 (1984) (citing Loraine P. Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or to Be
Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1981)).
6. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-11, State v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994)
(No. 58970-4). (Although the brief was submitted to the state court of appeals, the Washington
Supreme Court heard argument and issued a decision without a decision at the intermediate
appellate level.)
7. See text accompanying note 129.
8. Appellant's Reply Brief at 2-3, Riker (No. 58970-4).
9. Respondent's Opening Brief at 3, Riker (No. 58970-4).
10. State v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994) (affirming the trial court's decision
to exclude expert testimony on the BWS).
11. 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994).
12. Id. at 365, 869 P.2d at 50-51. The court held this evidence inadmissible even though
the duress defense implicates the defendant's state of mind. See infra note 140. For a complete
discussion of the defense of duress, see infra text accompanying notes 236-265.
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regard to expert testimony mandate that courts admit BWS testimony
where the defendant claims a defense of duress, regardless of the
factual context in which the duress occurred. Because of the Riker
court's result-oriented approach, the erroneous decision will adversely
impact criminal defendants for years to come. Part I of this Note
provides background on the admissibility requirements for novel
scientific evidence and expert testimony in Washington. Part II
discusses the history of the BWS, including the original research, the
effects of the syndrome, and the scientific acceptance of this phenome-
non. Part III more closely examines Washington's use of BWS
testimony in cases where a battered woman's state of mind is at issue.
Part IV discusses both the trial court and Washington Supreme Court
decisions in State v. Riker. Part V argues that the majority's decision
was erroneous because, in an effort to reach a particular result, the
majority misapplied both the Frye rule 3 and Washington Evidence
Rule 702 (ER 702)."4 Further, Part V argues that the majority
ignored the similarities between self-defense and duress, a proper
analysis of which would require admission of BWS testimony in cases
of duress.
I. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
IN WASHINGTON
Because trial judges lack scientific expertise, courts are reluctant
to admit scientific evidence unless the theory or procedure used has
been carefully scrutinized, thereby ensuring its validity."5 Further,
because the average person lacks the training and experience necessary
to interpret scientific evidence, experts are needed to explain the
foundation for such evidence to the jury.'6
Washington courts engage in a two-step inquiry to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony regarding novel scientific evidence. 7
13. For a description of the Frye rule, see infra part I.A.
14. For a description of ER 702, see infra part I.B.
15. See State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 886-87, 846 P.2d 502, 505 (1993) (stating that
because trial judges lack scientific expertise, the Frye analysis requires that courts admit only that
testimony which scientists agree is reliable). In determining whether or not certain expert
testimony has a valid scientific basis, courts may rely on opinions from other jurisdictions,
literature on the subject, law reviews, and other journals. Id. at 888, 846 P.2d at 506.
16. C.f State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984) (explaining that
the jury must be given a "professional explanation of the battering syndrome and its effects on
the woman through the use of expert testimony").
17. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 359, 869 P.2d at 47.
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First, the evidence must satisfy the Frye standard.18 Under Frye,
courts determine, as a matter of law, whether such evidence has
"achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community."' 9
Second, the proposed testimony must be properly admissible under ER
702.20 Under ER 702, courts will admit expert testimony if the
witness qualifies as an expert and if the testimony would be helpful to
the trier of fact.21 In determining whether expert testimony regarding
scientific evidence is admissible, a trial court must analyze the Frye
issue first. 2
A. The Frye Standard
The standard applied by Washington courts for determining the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence was originally set out in Frye
v. United States. 23 In Frye, the court determined that novel scientific
18. Id. The Frye standard was originally set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923). See infra part I.A. for further discussion of the Frye standard.
19. State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 719, 684 P.2d 651, 654 (1984) (citing Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
20. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 359, 869 P.2d at 47.
21. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 890, 846 P.2d at 507.
22. Id. at 890 n.4, 846 P.2d at 507 n.4. Early decisions interpreting ER 702 and Frye
mistakenly characterized this process in three steps. Any confusion regarding the correct analysis
was firmly clarified in Cauthron:
To reiterate, trial courts should initially make a Frye determination as to the general
acceptance of the scientific principle underlying the expert's proposed testimony. Once
the court is satisfied that there exists general acceptance in the appropriate scientific
community, the court should look to ER 702 to determine the admissibility of the
expert's testimony.
Id. While the trial court's application of ER 702 is reviewed for abuse of discretion, the Frye
application is reviewed de novo. Id.
23. Id. at 886, 846 P.2d at 505 (citing Frye v. United States 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
The jurisdictions in which the following cases were decided join Washington in applying the Frye
standard: State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1578 (1994); People
v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993); People v.
Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 157 Ill. 2d 519, vacated, 650 N.E.2d
1037 (IM. App. Ct. 1995); Petrey v. Commonwealth, No. 94-CA-000360-MR, 1995 WL 457212
(Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1995); State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. 1994); State v. Hill, 865
S.W.2d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763 (Neb. 1994); People v.
Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994); State v. Vandebogart, 652 A.2d 671 (N.H. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994); Dickeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943 (Utah
App. 1994).
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court abolished the Frye standard in favor of a more
lenient rule for admitting expert scientific testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The Daubert court abolished the "general acceptance" test mandated by
the Frye standard because Frye was at odds with the "liberal thrust" of Federal Rule of Evidence
702. Id. at 2794. Although four jurisdictions have adopted Daubert in favor of Frye, see State v.
Albericao, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 327 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995); Department of Social Servs. v. McCarty, 506 N.W.2d 144, 146-47 (S.D. 1993); State v.
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evidence "must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."24  The Frye
standard is not a separate rule of evidence. Rather, it is a limitation on
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence under ER 702.2"
Under the Frye standard, expert testimony regarding novel
scientific evidence must satisfy a two-part test: First, the expert's
underlying theory must be "generally accepted in the scientific commu-
nity."' 26  Second, there must exist "techniques, experiments, or studies
utilizing that theory which are capable of producing reliable results and
are generally accepted in the scientific community. '' 27  Once a
jurisdiction has accepted a scientific theory under Frye, the theory is
no longer novel and need not undergo a Frye analysis again.28
B. Evidence Rule 702
After a court determines that novel scientific evidence satisfies the
Frye standard, the court must analyze the proposed testimony under
ER 702.29 Although Frye applies only to the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence, ER 702 is the rule of evidence by which all expert
testimony is admitted. ER 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.3"
Thus, in Washington, expert testimony is admissible under ER 702
when (1) "[tlhe witness qualifies as an expert," and (2) "the testimony
Streich, 658 A.2d 38, 46 (Vt. 1995), the Washington Supreme Court has consistently applied the
Frye standard and continues to employ it. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 886, 846 P.2d at 505.
Currently, there are three cases pending before the Washington State Supreme Court in which
the court is considering application of the Daubert standard in the criminal context: State v.
Copeland (No. 62417-8), State v. Jones (No. 62317-1), and State v. Cannon (No. 62416-0).
However, it is unlikely that the Washington Supreme Court will abandon the Frye standard in
favor of Daubert in light of its recent ruling in Reese v. Stroh, 128 Wash. 2d 300, 907 P.2d 282
(1995) (declining to adopt Daubert in a civil case).
24. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
25. See Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 890 n.4, 846 P.2d at 507 n.4.
26. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 359, 869 P.2d at 47-48 (emphasis added).
27. Id. (emphasis added). The techniques used to determine whether or not one is a battered
woman include questionnaires, interviews, and behavioral characteristic tests. Telephone
Interview with Karil Klingbeil (Mar. 6, 1995).
28. See Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 888 n.3, 846 P.2d at 506 n.3.
29. Id. at 889-90, 846 P.2d at 507.
30. WASH. R. EVID. 702.
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is helpful to the trier of fact."'31  While both elements of ER 702
must be satisfied, admissibility will typically turn on prong two-
whether the testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact.32  Expert
testimony is helpful to the trier of fact if it is relevant. 33
Relevant testimony is governed by Evidence Rule 401 (ER 401) 31
and Evidence Rule 403 (ER 403).35 ER 401 provides a liberal
definition of relevance, requiring only the following: (1) the testimony
must have the "tendency to prove or disprove a fact," and (2) the
testimony "must be of some consequence in the context of the other
facts and the applicable substantive law."'36  Traditionally, these
requirements are referred to as probative value37 and materiality.38
ER 403 is a limitation on ER 401. 39  Under ER 403, even
relevant evidence may be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial,
confusing, or a waste of time.4" Applying a balancing process, courts
will exclude evidence if its negative character outweighs its general
relevance.4 However, a judge may not exclude evidence merely
because she disbelieves it.42 This question is a matter of credibility
and is strictly for the jury to decide.43
31. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 890, 846 P.2d at 507.
32. See, e.g., State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 846 P.2d 502 (1993).
33. State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 575, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984).
34. Evidence Rule 401 provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." WASH. R. EVID. 401.
35. Evidence Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." WASH. R. EVID. 403.
36. See State v. Sargent, 40 Wash. App. 340, 348 n.3, 698 P.2d 598, 604 n.3 (1985) (citing
5 KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, EVIDENCE § 82 (2d ed. 1982)), rev'd on other
grounds, 111 Wash. 2d 641 (1989).
37. State v. Bebb, 44 Wash. App. 803, 814, 723 P.2d 512, 518 (1986) (citing 5 KARL B.
TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, EVIDENCE § 83 (2d. ed 1982)), aff'd, 108 Wash. 2d 515,
740 P.2d 829 (1987). Probative value is established by a minimum showing of relevance. That
is, if testimony has any tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable, it is
relevant. Id.
38. State v. Rice, 48 Wash. App. 7, 12, 737 P.2d 726, 729 (1987) (citing 5 KARL B.
TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, EVIDENCE § 82 (2d. ed 1982)). Material evidence includes
facts bearing on the credibility or probative value of other evidence. Id. Thus, evidence that is
introduced to prove an element of a defense is material evidence. Id.
39. WASH. R. EVID. 403.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 5 KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, EVIDENCE § 106 (2d. ed 1982) (citing
United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631-33 (11th Cir. 1983); Ballon v. Henri Studios, 656 F.2d
1147, 1153-55 (5th Cir. 1981)).
43. Id.
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Relevance under both ER 401 and ER 403, then, is intricately
related to the jury's role in the case. Washington courts have held that
testimony is relevant if it assists the jury to understand a phenomenon
that is outside the competence of the average lay person." The BWS
is an example of just such a phenomenon.
II. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
The BWS is a psychological term of art that explains "the
measurable psychological changes that occur after exposure to repeated
abuse. ' 4' The BWS is not an illness, "it is a collection of thoughts,
feelings, and actions that logically follow a frightening experience that
one expects could be repeated." 46  Dr. Lenore E. Walker is largely
responsible for the development of the BWS and is a nationally
recognized expert in this area.47  Dr. Walker defines a battered
woman as "one who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do some-
thing he wants her to do without any concern for her rights."4 8
There is no typical battered woman because the syndrome affects
women from all socio-economic groups and religions.49
A. The Study
Dr. Walker conducted one of the first scientific research projects
studying the psychological effects of repeated abuse on battered
women.'o The results of Dr. Walker's study are based on tests
conducted on 435 battered women.5" According to Dr. Walker, a
woman is diagnosed as a battered woman when she has experienced at
44. See State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 275, 751 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1988) (citing State v.
Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984)).
45. Walker, supra note 5, at 326. The BWS is a sub-category of the Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder, id. at 327, and is a "recognized phenomenon in the psychiatric profession." Colette M.
Smith, Comment, Recovered Memories of Alleged Sexual Abuse: An Analysis of the Theory of
Repressed Memories Under the Washington Rules of Evidence, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 51, 78
(1994).
46. Walker, supra note 5, at 327.
47. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 177 (Ct. App. 1989).
48. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 15 (1979). Battered women suffer
many forms of abuse including non-verbal abuse and verbal threats of future punishment. Beth
I.Z. Boland, Battered Women Who Act Under Duress, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 603, 608 (1994).
49. State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 277, 751 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1988) (referring to
testimony by Karil Klingbeil).
50. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter
SYNDROME].
51. Id. at 208. Originally the study began with 435 women; however, the actual results and
conclusions reached by Dr. Walker are based on her analysis of 403 women. Id.
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least two cycles of violence with the same intimate partner.12  In
reaching this diagnosis, it is clinically insignificant whether or not a
woman is currently involved in an intimate relationship with her
batterer1 3  Thus, even though seventy-six percent of the women
involved in Dr. Walker's study were no longer involved in battering
relationships at the time of testing, they were all clinically diagnosed
as "battered women. ' 54
B. The Effects of Violence on Battered Women
Dr. Walker's research reveals several components of the BWS.
First, her study confirms that battering relationships are composed of
cycles of violence. 5 Second, because battered women are unable to
control their batterers' abuse, they become "helpless" in an otherwise
escapable situation. 6 Third, due to the repeated abuse they suffer,
battered women behave like trauma victims. 7 As a result, they are
hypervigilant to their surroundings.5"
Dr. Walker's pioneering research led to the discovery of the
"Walker Cycle Theory of Violence."5 9  This theory describes three
distinct phases to a battering relationship. In phase one, the tension
building phase, the batterer indulges in psychological torture of the
woman. 60 This torture is followed by phase two, an "acute battering
incident," in which the inevitable tension that has built up results in
52. Id. at 203.
53. Id. at 15 (stating that "[aill 403 women reported on a battering relationship, as that was
the criteria for inclusion in the sample, while only 203 had a nonbattering relationship to report");
see also Letter from Lenore Walker, Walker & Associates, to Ann-Marie Montgomery, Seattle
University Law Review (Mar. 9, 1995) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review) [hereinafter
Letter from Lenore Walker (Mar. 9, 1995)].
54. SYNDROME, supra note 50, at 97; see also Letter from Lenore Walker (Mar. 9, 1995),
supra note 53. Dr. Walker found that battered women suffer the same type of psychological
torture that both prisoners of war and hostage victims experience. In her study, this psychological
abuse included threats such as death of family, death of self, and other vague threats.
SYNDROME, supra note 50, at 27.
55. SYNDROME, supra note 50, at 95.
56. See id. at 86-87.
57. Walker, supra note 5, at 326.
58. Id. at 328.
59. For an extensive discussion of this theory, see SYNDROME, supra note 50, at 2.
60. Id. at 95. In this phase, the batterer expresses hostility toward the woman by calling her
names and/or engaging in some physical abuse. In order to control the batterer's anger, the
woman tries to placate him in hopes that he will not become further aggravated. Many times a
battered woman succeeds in reducing the batterer's hostility "which reinforces her unrealistic
belief that she can control" him. Id. However, soon the woman realizes that she cannot control
the batterer's "angry response pattern," and she therefore begins to withdraw. Id.
392
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an uncontrollable discharge of violence.61 In phase three, the batterer
expresses "loving contrition" by apologizing profusely and showing
kindness and remorse.62 It is this third phase that is the most
troublesome because the batterer's behavior provides the woman with
positive reinforcement for staying in the relationship.63
This positive reinforcement leads battered women to experience
a sense of learned helplessness.64 The theory of learned helplessness
explains the counter-intuitive nature of the battered woman's responses
to the incessant abuse she suffers.6" It is difficult for an individual
who has never suffered from a battering relationship to understand
why a victim of repeated abuse would choose to stay in the relation-
ship, refuse to call the police, or refuse to seek psychological help.66
However, the violence in these relationships is random and unpredict-
able; hence, women begin to doubt their own natural responses to
danger.6 7
When a woman realizes that her behavior bears no relationship to
the violence she receives, she develops "survival or coping skills that
keep [her] alive with minimal injuries." 6' For example, many
battered women become passive after an abusive incident.69 These
coping skills are developed at the expense of escaping skills, which may
61. Id. at 182. In phase two, women are subjected to life threatening violence. This violence
includes broken eardrums, severe cuts or burns, broken bones, permanent head injuries, black
eyes, lost teeth, and concussions. Id.
62. Id. at 96.
63. Id.
64. Id. The theory of learned helplessness was developed by Martin Seligman. Seligman
studied the effects of intermittent and non-contingent shocks on dogs. These dogs developed
perceptual distortions because the pain they received could not be accurately determined. Thus,
the dogs refused to escape their situations even when no fence restrained them. Id. at 86-87.
65. In the words ofDr. Walker, "The theory oflearned helplessness attempts to demonstrate
how a seemingly normal functioning woman loses the ability to predict that what she does will
have an impact upon her safety." Walker, supra note 5, at 330.
66. Monique M. Gousie, Comment, From Self-Defense To Coercion: McMaugh v. State Use
Of Battered Woman's Syndrome To Defend Wife's Involvement In Third-Party Murder, 28 NEW.
ENG. L. REV. 453, 474 (1993) ("Absent the expert testimony, the jury would and did have
difficulty understanding why [the defendant] 'would get in a car with a drunk, violent, and
heavily armed man... [and] did not either resist him, or refuse to go-and why she sat passively,
waiting for events to unfold."').
67. Walker, supra note 5, at 330; see also SYNDROME, supra note 50, at 86.
68. SYNDROME, supra note 50, at 33.
69. Id. at 33, 87. Another coping mechanism used by battered women is minimizing the
violence that they experience. Id. at 24. "Battered women may omit descriptions of their
batterer's violent acts because they fear... that talking about the violence in too much detail will
upset the precarious situation and cause [them] further harm." Id.
1996]
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include anger and active behavior, skills that would enable the battered
woman to leave the relationship.70
The synergistic effects of the cycles of violence and learned
helplessness are profound. 71 A symptom of these effects is hypervigi-
lance, a symptom that all battered women share. 72 Battered women
are hypervigilant to cues of potential danger and are acutely aware of
their surroundings.73 To a battered woman, otherwise insignificant
behaviors such as an eye twitch, a particular tone of voice, or a certain
movement are all things that may signal an impending attack by a
male.74 Contrary to societal belief,7" this hypervigilance continues
whether or not a battered woman stays in the particular violent
relationship. 76  Analyzing a battered woman's hypervigilance, Dr.
Walker states:
[W]omen are hypervigilant to cues of impending danger and
accurately perceive the seriousness of the situation before another
person who had not been repeatedly abused might recognize the
danger. They may make a preemptive strike before the abuser has
actually inflicted much physical damage, anticipating his next moves
from what they know from previous experience. Or, they might
wait until the man has stopped for awhile, knowing that he will
begin his assault again.77
Illustrating a battered woman's hypervigilant behavior, Dr.
Walker analogizes a battered woman to an animal who has been in a
forest fire and then jumps when a match is lit.78  Both the animal's
and the battered woman's reactions are instinctual. That is why a
battered woman may exhibit hypervigilant behavior in response to
threats made by persons other than her batterer.79  Accordingly,
70. See id. at 33, 87.
71. Walker, supra note 5, at 328.
72. Id.
73. These women are particularly aware of little things that signal an impending attack. Id.;
see also infra note 108 and accompanying text.
74. Walker, supra note 5, at 328.
75. Id. at 333.
76. Letter from Lenore Walker (Mar. 9, 1995), supra note 53. Ms. Walker states that the
hypervigilant reaction takes the longest to heal. See Walker, supra note 5. Additionally, when
battered women are placed in a dangerous situation, they can experience flashbacks of a previously
abusive incident. This is particularly problematic because these flashbacks increase the battered
woman's perception of danger. Id. at 327-28. In fact, sometimes it is impossible for battered
women to separate the flashback from the current situation. Id. at 328.
77. Walker, supra note 5, at 324.
78. Letter from Lenore Walker (Mar. 9, 1995), supra note 53.
79. Letter from Lenore Walker, Walker & Associates, to Ann-Marie Montgomery, Seattle
University Law Review (Mar. 24, 1995) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review)
[Vol. 19:385
1996] Battered Women Under Duress
battered women may perceive behavior by males (other than their
batterers) as threatening, while a non-battered woman would not
perceive the same behavior as threatening in any way.80
III. WASHINGTON ALLOWS EXPERT TESTIMONY OF THE
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME IN CASES WHERE A BATTERED
WOMAN'S STATE OF MIND IS AT ISSUE
The BWS is not a separate legal defense."1  Rather, BWS
testimony aids jurors in understanding the syndrome's psychological
effects on women who suffer from it. 2 As Dr. Walker explains:
[T]estimony about the psychological knowledge concerning the
dynamics of an abusive relationship and its psychological impact on
the woman's state of mind [is needed] to help meet the legal
standard of self-defense or duress which might not be otherwise met
if the history of abuse was not known. The psychologist is asked to
evaluate first if the woman was a battered woman; second, if the
abuse caused the development of Battered Woman Syndrome (which
is a sub-category of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ... ), and
third, if so, how that impacted on the woman's state of mind at the
time of the action for which she is charged."
The Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly admitted BWS
testimony in cases where a battered woman's state of mind was at
issue, making it clear that BWS testimony is admissible under both
Frye and ER 702.84
[hereinafter Letter from Lenore Walker (Mar. 24, 1995)].
80. Letter from Lenore Walker (Mar. 9, 1995), supra note 53.
81. Susan D. Appel, Note, Beyond Self-Defense: The Use of Battered Woman Syndrome In
Duress Defenses, U. ILL. L. REV. 955, 958 (1994).
82. State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984).
83. Walker, supra note 5, at 323 (emphasis added).
84. See, e.g., Allevy, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984); State v. Ciskie, 110
Wash. 2d at 263, 265, 751 P.2d 1165, 1166 (1988). These holdings are in accord with decisions
of other jurisdictions. For example, BWS evidence was admitted in the following self-defense
cases: Ex parte Hill, 507 So. 2d 558 (Ala. 1987); People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989);
People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831 (Colo. 1989), aff'd, 800 P.2d 1317 (1990); Hawthorne v. State, 470
So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Motes v. State, 384 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. 1989); People v.
Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209 (Ilt. 1983); State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); State
v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988) (sleeping husband case); Commonwealth v. Craig, 783
S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990); State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 421 (La. Ct. App.), urrit denied, 468 So. 2d
570 (1985); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); Commonwealth v. Moore, 514 N.E.2d
1342 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Mich. 1989) (sleeping husband
case), rev'd, 441 N.W.2d 793 (1989); May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, (Miss. 1984); State v.
Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Jackson, 435 N.W.2d 893 (Neb. 1989);
State v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235 (N.H. 1985); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); State v.
Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. 1986); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985);
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A. In Washington, Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony Passes
the Frye Analysis
Recall that when a jurisdiction has accepted a scientific theory
under Frye, the theory is no longer novel and need not undergo the
Frye analysis again.85  In State v. Allery, 86 where a murder defendant
claimed she acted in self-defense, the Washington Supreme Court held
that the BWS was sufficiently recognized in the scientific community
to be admitted via expert testimony under the first prong of Frye.87
The Allery court's holding was clear: "Where the psychologist is
qualified to testify about the battered woman syndrome, and the
defendant establishes her identity as a battered woman, expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome is admissible." 88
Four years later, in State v. Ciskie,89 the Washington Supreme
Court appropriately reaffirmed, without additional analysis, that the
BWS is an accepted psychological theory in the scientific communi-
ty.90 Ciskie did not involve a battered woman claiming self-defense.
Rather, the State introduced expert testimony of the BWS to explain
why a rape victim would not call the police.9 Although Ciskie
involved a different factual context than Allery, the Washington
Supreme Court ruled that the testimony had already been found
admissible under Frye.92 Therefore, the Ciskie court did not entertain
a Frye analysis,93 and no Washington case challenged the BWS under
the Frye standard until State v. Riker.94
State v. Clark, 377 S.E.2d 54 (N.C. 1989); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983)
(sleeping husband case); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990); Commonwealth v.
Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1986); State v. Furlough,
797 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990); Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1988); Blair
v. Blair, 575 A.2d 191 (Vt. 1990); State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552 (Va. 1979); State v. Lambert,
312 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1983).
For criticism of BWS testimony in self-defense cases, see David L. Faigman, Note, The
Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619
(1986).
85. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 888 n.3, 846 P.2d 502, 506 n.3 (1993).
86. 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
87. Id. at 597, 682 P.2d at 316.
88. Id.
89. 110 Wash. 2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988).
90. Id. at 271, 751 P.2d at 1170.
91. Id. at 271-72, 751 P.2d at 1169-70.
92. Id. at 271-72, 751 P.2d at 1170.
93. Id. at 271-72, 751 P.2d at 1169-70.
94. 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994).
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B. In Washington, Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony is Properly
Admissible Under ER 702
In both Allery and Ciskie, the Washington Supreme Court
admitted BWS testimony because, when offered through an expert, it
was helpful to the trier of fact.95 Significantly, BWS testimony is not
admissible for purposes of general credibility.96 Nor is it admissible
to endorse what the defendant did.97 Rather, it is admitted to help
jurors understand why the battered defendant failed to act in what
would seem a more "normal" way.98 BWS testimony is relevant and,
thus, helpful to the trier of fact for several reasons: (1) it bolsters the
defendant's credibility,99 (2) it explains her perception of danger,'00
and (3) it explains why her fear of danger is reasonable. 10'
First, BWS evidence is relevant because it bolsters the defendant's
credibility. Because the effects of the BWS are outside the knowledge
of the average juror, 102 expert testimony is needed to dispel danger-
ous misconceptions about battered women and to assist jurors in
understanding a battered woman's behaviors and responses. For
example, it is difficult to understand (1) why a battered woman
remains in a relationship that is psychologically and physically
dangerous, 10 3 and (2) why a battered woman does not seek help or
call the police."°4 Jurors cannot fairly or accurately assess the defen-
dant's behavior without an educated understanding of the counter-
intuitive nature of the BWS.10° Without the aid of expert testimony,
a jury may think that a battered woman's failure to leave the relation-
ship signals exaggeration of the violent nature of the incidents*106
95. SeeAlleiy, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 316; Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d at 279, 751 P.2d
at 1173. While recognizing that BWS testimony is helpful to explain a battered woman's
perception of fear, courts may refuse to admit this evidence if the battered woman's mental state
is not at issue. See, e.g., State v. Hanson, 58 Wash. App. 504, 508, 793 P.2d 1001, 1003
(upholding the trial court's refusal to admit BWS testimony where the defendant claimed that she
accidentally shot her battering husband), rev. denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1033 (1990).
96. Hanson, 58 Wash. App. at 507, 793 P.2d at 1002 (concluding that BWS evidence cannot
be introduced solely "to enhance the general credibility of the defendant").
97. Id. at 509, 793 P.2d at 1003.
98. Id.
99. This applies to those defendants whose state of mind and perceptions are at issue. See
infra note 107.
100. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 371, 869 P.2d at 54 (Utter, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
101. Alleyy, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 316.
102. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d at 274, 751 P.2d at 1171.
103. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-11, Riker (No. 58970-4).
104. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 316.
105. Id. at 594, 682 P.2d at 314.
106. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11, Riker (No. 58970-4).
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Thus, many jurors may not believe the defendant's testimony
regarding past abuse or her version of the particular events that are
critical to her defense.10 7
Second, BWS evidence is relevant to explain the battered woman's
perception of danger. Without expert testimony providing a basic
framework for evaluating the defendant's behavior, lay jurors cannot
understand the gravity of a battered woman's perceptions of danger.
For example, they will not understand how seemingly innocuous
behavior may actually be a life-threatening signal to the battered
woman.108
BWS evidence is particularly important in self-defense cases' °9
because the defendant's perception of "imminent danger" is a purely
subjective element."" Jurors must evaluate the evidence "from the
standpoint of the reasonably prudent person, knowing all the defendant
knows and seeing all the defendant sees,""' and they must consider
the facts and circumstances that were known to her before the
crime," 2 which include evidence of battering. To accurately assess
the degree of force a battered woman uses, jurors must put themselves
in the defendant's shoes. "In no other way could the jury safely say
what a reasonably prudent [person] similarly situated would have
done."' 13
Third, BWS testimony is relevant to explain the reasonableness of
the defendant's fear. For example, although the defendant's perception
107. A juror's lack of understanding is a constant fear that battered women face. See
SYNDROME, supra note 50, at 23. According to Dr. Walker,
[M]ost battered women do not think anyone will believe the actual level of violence
experienced. Indeed, in legal cases attorneys often suggest highlighting only a few
battering incidents for fear the jury might not believe that so much violence could occur
without beginning to question the personality of the woman.
Id.
108. Battered women can perceive an imminent attack from innocuous behaviors such as eye
twitches, mannerisms, certain movements, and voice inflections. See Walker, supra note 5, at 325.
109. In Washington, a homicide is justified as self-defense if it occurs "[i]n the lawful
defense of the slayer .... when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of
the person slain.., to do some great personal injury to the slayer ... , and there is imminent
danger of such design being accomplished." WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.050(1) (1994).
The self-defense statute appears objective on its face. However, courts interpret this statute
as having both objective and subjective characteristics. State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 238,
850 P.2d 495, 504 (1993) (explaining the self-defense standard in the context of the battered child
syndrome).
110. See Allevy, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 316.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 594-95, 682 P.2d at 314.
113. Id. at 594, 682 P. 2d at 314 (quoting State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 235-36, 559
P.2d 548, 556 (1977)).
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of "imminent danger" in self-defense cases is a purely subjective
element, the jury must still employ the reasonable battered woman's
perspective, which is an objective standard." 4  As Dr. Walker
explains,
[I]t is ... difficult for a battered woman's perceptions to be under-
stood as reasonable without expert testimony to explain the typical
way any woman and in particular, this battered woman would have
perceived the same situation.
... [P]sychology can help the court by offering the research
data known about the dynamics of battering relationships and the
reasonableness of battered women's perception of imminent danger
in general as a way to compare the particular battered woman's level
of fear."'
These reasons illustrate how expert testimony of the BWS is
helpful to a jury in cases where a battered woman's state of mind is at
issue. Anyone who has not been a battered woman would not know,
without the aid of an expert, what is or is not a potentially life
threatening situation to a battered woman. Similarly, without expert
testimony, jurors cannot possibly know what is or is not a reasonable
response from a battered woman facing such a situation. With these
concepts in mind, one must conclude that State v. Riker is a tragic
decision.
IV. STATE V. RIKER
Washington precedent illustrates that BWS evidence is admissible
under Frye and ER 702 when a battered woman's state of mind is at
issue. It follows, then, that BWS evidence should be admitted in cases
where a battered woman defendant claims duress. Specifically, in cases
of duress, jurors are required to assess whether or not the defendant
was in fear of immediate injury and whether or not her fear was
reasonable.'16  In a very controversial case, State v. Riker,"7 the
Washington Supreme Court recently addressed the admissibility of
BWS testimony in the duress context.
114. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (1977); see also Janes,
121 Wash. 2d at 238, 850 P.2d at 504.
115. Walker, supra note 5, at 323, 325; see also Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d at 240, 559 P.2d at
558-59.
116. See infra note 140; see also State v. Turner, 42 Wash. App. 242, 245-46, 711 P.2d 353,
354-55 (1985).
117. 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994).
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A. The Facts
The defendant, Deborah Riker, was physically and psychologically
abused at a very early age." 8 For nine years, she was physically and
sexually assaulted by her first stepfather." 9  Her second stepfather
sexually abused Deborah when she received good grades or did
something right. 2 ' This abuse did not end with her childhood. At
age fifteen, Deborah married, and her husband sexually abused her
throughout the marriage.' 2 ' She then left the marriage, only to enter
into a series of subsequent abusive relationships. First, she lived with
a man who choked and hit her in order to control her behavior.'22
Her next boyfriend beat her at least fifty times, and her wounds were
severe: As a result of this boyfriend's beatings, Deborah suffered a
fractured skull and two broken wrists.'23 This relationship lasted
three-and-a-half years.'24 Deborah then entered at least two more
violent and psychologically torturous relationships before the summer
of 1987 when she met Rupert Burke.2 5
When Deborah met Burke, he was dating her sister, Suzanna' 26
Burke was a paid informant working with police officers who were
investigating Deborah. 27  Burke, who was posing as a marijuana
grower looking for weapons, was described by Deborah as a "Mafia
type."' 28  He used cocaine and was frequently violent with
Suzanna.'29 Deborah was aware that Burke physically abused her
sister. "'30
On June 16, 1987, Burke demanded that Suzanna get cocaine from
Deborah.' When Suzanna failed to reach Deborah, Burke threw
Suzanna against the wall and threatened, "You are going to keep trying
to get a hold of somebody, if you know what's good for you. You
have two kids to think about."' 32  Two undercover police officers
118. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-11, Riker (No. 58970-4).
119. Id. at 10-11.
120. Id. at 11.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 12.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 12-13.
126. Id. at 7.
127. Id. at 4-5.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Id.
130. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 356, 869 P.2d at 46.
131. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Riker (No. 58970-4).
132. Respondent's Brief at 23, Riker (No. 58970-4).
[Vol. 19:385
1996] Battered Women Under Duress
witnessed this threat.133 Suzanna tried again and finally reached
Deborah. On this day, Deborah first sold cocaine to Rupert
Burke.'34
Burke demanded cocaine from Deborah on two other occasions.
When she refused, he threatened that she and her sister would "know
the consequences.""13 Because Deborah believed that this threat was
life-endangering,136 she arranged an $18,000 cocaine buy upon
Burke's demand.'37 Although Deborah arranged the drug sale, she
decided not to participate in the deal. Burke actually bought the
cocaine from a third party. 3' Nonetheless, Deborah Riker was
charged with delivery and possession of cocaine.' 39
B. The Trial Court Decision
At trial, Deborah asserted a defense of duress. 40 Deborah
sought to introduce expert testimony on the BWS to explain two
elements of duress: (1) that Burke's threats put Deborah in fear of
"immediate grievous bodily injury," and (2) that Deborah's fear of
Burke was reasonable. 141
In an offer of proof to the court, BWS expert Karil Klingbeil
stated she would testify that the BWS is a widely accepted theory and
that Deborah was a battered woman. 42 Ms. Klingbeil offered that,
133. Id.
134. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Riker (No. 58970-4).
135. Appellant's Reply Brief at 3, Riker (No. 58970-4).
136. Id. at 4.
137. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Riker (No. 58970-4).
138. Id. at 6; Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 355, 869 P.2d at 45.
139. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Riker (No. 58970-4).
140. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 353, 869 P.2d at 45. Washington's duress statute states:
(1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:
(a) The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat
or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the actor that in case of
refusal he or another would be liable to immediate death or immediate grievous
bodily injury; and
(b) That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor; and
(c) That the actor would not have participated in the crime except for the duress
involved.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.060(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
141. AppeUant's Opening Brief at 18, Riker (No. 58970-4).
142. Respondent's Brief at 5-6, Riker (No. 58970-4). Karil Klingbeil is the founder of the
sexual assault unit at Harborview Medical Center and testified as an expert in the first case in
which Washington State accepted testimony on the BWS. See State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591,
595, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (1984). In Riker, both the State and the defense stipulated to Ms.
Klingbeil's qualifications as an expert. 123 Wash. 2d at 364, 869 P.2d at 50. In arriving at her
conclusion, Ms. Klingbeil relied on the following information: (1) standard psycho-social
interviews with Deborah and her sister, (2) administration of the MMPI and other behavioral
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due to Deborah's prior abuse, Deborah could not separate her fear and
experience with Mr. Burke from the other frightening experiences in
her life. 43
The State objected to this testimony, claiming that it was a novel
extension of the BWS to a context where the defendant was not
currently in an intimate relationship with her batterer.1" The State
based its objection on the fact that there were no current studies
explaining a battered woman's perception of fear outside the intimate
relationship context.14 The State also argued that Ms. Klingbeil's
conclusion that Deborah was a battered woman was inadmissible
testimony because it was not based on accepted scientific principles and
methodology. 4 6 The trial court agreed and excluded Ms. Klingbeil's
testimony. Deborah was convicted of delivery and possession of
cocaine and sentenced to four years in prison.1 47
C. The Washington Supreme Court Majority's Analysis
Deborah appealed her conviction and the Washington Supreme
Court granted direct review.1 48 In a 7-2 decision, the court affirmed
the trial court's ruling, holding that expert testimony regarding the
BWS is inadmissible in duress cases where the defendant was not
involved in an intimate relationship with the individual who put her
under duress.149  In reaching its decision, the court examined the
admissibility of expert testimony under Frye and ER 702 and then
discussed the policy of admitting BWS evidence in duress cases.150
The majority determined that the first part of the Frye analysis
was not at issue because the BWS is a generally accepted theory in the
characteristics of battered women, (3) administration of the cycle theory of violence, and (4)
knowledge of the fact that Deborah was recently involved in yet another violent battering
relationship. Telephone Interview with Karil Klingbeil, founder of the Harborview Medical
Center Sexual Assault Unit (Mar. 6, 1994).
143. Telephone Interview with Karil Klingbeil, founder of the Harborview Medical Center
Sexual Assault Unit (Mar. 6, 1994); Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 372-73, 869 P.2d at 54-55 (Utter,
J., dissenting).
144. Respondent's Brief at 54- 58, Riker (No. 58970-4). Specifically, the State claimed it was
a novel extension of BWS in this context because Burke and Deborah were not involved in an
intimate relationship and Burke never actually hit her. Id.
145. Id. at 55-58.
146. Id.
147. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 358, 869 P.2d at 47.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 363, 869 P.2d at 50.
150. Id. at 360, 869 P.2d at 48.
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scientific community.' However, it then determined that the expert
testimony in this case failed the second part of the Frye analysis,"5 2
under which expert testimony must be based on accepted scientific
methods. The Riker court determined that the use of expert testimony
on the BWS to explain Deborah's fear of Burke was novel because
Deborah and Burke were not involved in an intimate relationship.'53
Because the court could not identify any scientific studies involving
application of the BWS in a non-intimate, non-battering context, the
court concluded that the extension of the syndrome to this context had
not yet achieved the necessary "general scientific acceptance."' 54
Under this analysis, the court determined that Ms. Klingbeil's opinion
amounted to no more than an "unsupported guess."' 55
The court went on to examine Ms. Klingbeil's testimony under
ER 702,156 which requires that the witness qualify as an expert and
that the testimony be helpful to the trier of fact. Because Ms.
Klingbeil's qualifications were not at issue,15 7 the court focused its
analysis on whether or not the testimony would be helpful to the trier
of fact.' The majority found that the trial court correctly excluded
the expert's testimony because the testimony was not relevant and,
thus, would not assist the trier of fact. 9 The court pointed to the
relationship between Deborah and Burke, indicating that because they
were only brief acquaintances who engaged in limited contacts, BWS
testimony was not probative. 60  This conclusion rested, in part, on
151. Id. (citing State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 234-36, 850 P.2d 495, 502-03 (1993); State
v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 271, 751 P.2d 1165, 1170 (1988); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d
591, 596-98, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (1984)).
152. Id. at 362, 869 P.2d at 49. For a discussion of the Frye test, see supra part I.A.
153. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 363, 869 P.2d at 50.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 364, 869 P.2d at 50.
156. Id. For a discussion of ER 702, see supra part I.B.
157. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 359-60, 869 P.2d at 47-48 ("The first part of this inquiry was
never at issue since the parties stipulated at trial that Dr. Klingbeil is an expert on the battered
woman syndrome.").
158. Id. at 364, 869 P.2d at 50.
159. Id. at 364-65, 869 P.2d at 50.
160. Id. at 365, 869 P.2d at 50. The court also relied on a test used by a Nebraska court.
Id. at 364, 869 P.2d at 50 (citing State v. Reynolds, 457 N.W.2d 405, 419 (Neb. 1990)). The
Nebraska test for relevancy depends on a case-by-case analysis. Under that test, the court's
conclusion that evidence is relevant or not relevant depends on (1) "the court's evaluation of the
state of knowledge presently existing about the subject of the proposed testimony," and (2) "the
court's appraisal of the facts of the case." Id. at 364, 869 P.2d at 50. This Nebraska test has not
been used in any other Washington case. See infra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
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the supposed absence of specific studies regarding the effects of
battering outside the intimate battering relationship."'
After concluding that testimony on the BWS was inadmissible
under both the Frye standard and ER 702, the court examined policy
reasons for refusing to admit BWS evidence in cases of duress. The
majority was concerned that if it extended BWS testimony to cases of
duress, "the evidentiary doors [would] be thrown open to every
conceivable emotional trauma. 162  According to the majority, the
duress defense is viewed with skepticism. In so stating, the court
relied on the language of the duress statute, which requires that the
defendant apprehend "immediate harm" as opposed to only "imminent
harm," as is required for self-defense.163 In the majority's opinion,
allowing BWS evidence in cases of duress would have a more socially
harmful outcome than allowing the same testimony in cases of self-
defense where the defendant and the victim were in an intimate,
battering relationship."6 Thus, in light of its Frye analysis, its ER
702 analysis, and its policy considerations, the majority held that BWS
testimony is inadmissible in cases of duress where the defendant was
not in a current intimate relationship with her batterer."6 s
D. The Dissent's Analysis
Two justices disagreed with the majority decision in Riker.166
Writing for the dissent, Justice Robert Utter explained that the trial
court should not have undertaken a Frye analysis because the BWS, as
a general theory, is already scientifically accepted and recognized. 16 7
Thus, whether or not an intimate relationship existed between Deborah
and Burke was "without legal consequence. '"168
Justice Utter recognized that BWS testimony is intended to
explain how "severe abuse operates to alter the victim's state of mind
in general, and the perception of danger in particular." 69 According
to the dissent, BWS testimony is helpful to the trier of fact because, in
appropriate cases, jurors are required to evaluate the reasonableness of
161. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 365, 869 P.2d at 50.
162. Id. at 366 n.5, 869 P.2d at 51 n.5.
163. Id. at 365, 869 P.2d at 51.
164. See id. at 365-66, 869 P.2d at 51.
165. Id.
166. Justices Robert F. Utter and Charles Johnson were the only dissenters. Id. at 370, 869
P.2d at 53.
167. Id. at 372, 869 P.2d at 54 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923) and State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 594-98, 682 P.2d 312, 314-16 (1984)).
168. Id. at 371, 869 P.2d at 54.
169. Id.
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the defendant's apprehension of harm. 7' Because Deborah offered
BWS testimony to help the jury understand her perception of Burke's
threats,' 7' the dissent reasoned that the testimony was relevant to
show why Deborah feared immediate harm and why Deborah's
perception of the threat was reasonable.'72  The testimony was
therefore helpful to the trier of fact under ER 702.'17
V. ANALYSIS OF STATE V. RIKER
A. Riker Was A Result-Oriented Decision
The court's decision in Riker was result-oriented and partial to the
State. Several indicators throughout the opinion evidence the court's
result-oriented approach. For example, the court relayed the State's
version of the facts, expressed its fear of extending BWS testimony too
far, misinterpreted research on the BWS, and showed lack of confi-
dence in jurors. All of these factors lead to a compromised outcome.
Beginning with the facts of the case, the court relayed the State's
version of events.'74 Although the court "briefly" outlined Deborah's
testimony regarding both her dealings with Burke as well as her history
of abuse, it is clear from the court's language that the majority did not
believe her. For example, the court used the word "claimed" when
describing events to which Deborah testified. "' When describing
Deborah's fear of Burke, the court pointed out that Deborah feared his
threats in spite of the facts that Deborah never saw bruises on her
sister, Burke never hit Deborah, and Burke never made his threats
more specific. 176 The court's discussion of the facts sounds more like
a judicial assessment of the defendant's credibility than an impartial
description of events. The court's discussion of the duress defense was
no less skewed.
Pointing to society's traditional skepticism of duress, the court
communicated its apprehension in admitting BWS testimony in this
drug-related case."' The court stated loudly and clearly that it was"reluctan[t] to allow even the abnormal stresses of life to provide a
basis for the [duress] defense."'78 The court supported this assertion
170. Id.
171. Id. at 371-72, 869 P.2d at 54.
172. Id. at 374-75, 869 P.2d at 56.
173. Id. at 375, 869 P.2d at 56.
174. Id. at 354-55, 869 P.2d at 45-46.
175. Id. at 354, 356-57, 869 P.2d at 45-46.
176. Id. at 356, 869 P.2d at 46.
177. See id. at 365, 869 P.2d at 50-51.
178. Id. at 365, 869 P.2d at 51.
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by contrasting the self-defense and duress statutory language, and by
accepting, without discussion, one commentator's opinion that the
duress defense is an excuse rather than a justification. 79 However,
the court failed to examine the similarities between self-defense and
duress and ignored an opinion shared by several scholars that duress,
like self-defense, is a justification, not an excuse.180
Moreover, the majority misinterpreted BWS research. For
example, the court asserted, without support, that allowing BWS
testimony in Deborah Riker's case would be tantamount to throwing
open the evidentiary doors to every conceivable emotional trauma.18'
The court's opinion was based on its belief that there was no founda-
tion establishing that Deborah could distinguish her fear "from that of
every other citizen who has a troubled past."' 82 What is profoundly
apparent in this statement is the court's ignorance of the BWS.
Deborah is not every other citizen who has a troubled past; she is a
battered woman who was forced to sell cocaine to a man who
threatened her life if she failed to comply with his demands.
Even more disturbing is the court's lack of confidence in jurors
deciding a duress case. The court speculated that "the jury's finding
of duress would rest upon sympathy for the defendant, rather than an
evaluation of her present danger."'1 3  The court doubted the exis-
tence of competent jurors who would evaluate Deborah's fears as
required by law under the duress statute. The court stated, without
support, that jurors would simply ignore their duty under the law,"s
but the court did not address the obvious disparity in its own logic:
that jurors in self-defense cases are somehow more competent to
evaluate BWS evidence than jurors in duress cases.
Clearly, the Washington Supreme Court has reservations in
admitting BWS testimony in a drug case where the defendant claims
duress. Although these reservations reflect important policy consider-
ations, the Riker court allowed them to inhibit its legal reasoning. In
short, the court's desire to reach a particular result compromised its
ability to correctly analyze the admissibility requirements under both
Frye and ER 702.
179. Id. at 366 n.4, 869 P.2d at 51 n.4.
180. Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 251, 257-58 (1995) (explaining that scholars including Wayne LaFave, Austin Scott,
Glanville Williams, and Jeremy Benthan agree that duress is a justification).
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B. The Riker Court Misapplied Frye
The Riker court correctly found that the first part of the Frye
analysis was not at issue because the BWS is a generally accepted
theory in the scientific community.' However, the court incorrectly
determined that Ms. Klingbeil's testimony failed the second prong of
Frye. This conclusion was erroneous because the Frye standard does
not apply to novel "contexts," only novel "theories." Moreover, even
if Frye did apply, the court erred further by inquiring into Ms.
Klingbeil's conclusion that Deborah Riker was a battered woman who
could not separate her fear of Burke from other battering experiences.
Finally, the basis for the court's misapplication of Frye, the lack of
specific studies on point, is unsound.
1. Frye Does Not Apply to Novel Contexts, Only Novel Theories
Washington case law states that the Frye standard applies only to
novel theories, not novel contexts.186 Although the Riker court was
troubled that admitting Ms. Klingbeil's testimony in a non-intimate,
non-battering context would be an extension of the BWS, this
reservation should not affect the admissibility of this testimony.'87
Once a theory has garnered general acceptance, experts can testify to
novel applications of the theory without undergoing a Frye analysis
each time. Two Washington decisions illustrate this principle: State
v. Lord... and State v. Noltie.18 9
In State v. Lord, the Washington Supreme Court held that epi-
illumination microscopy passed the Frye analysis. 19° In Lord, an
185. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Although the court conducted an analysis
under Frye, it did not have to do so. The Frye standard is only used in admitting novel scientific
evidence. State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 232, 850 P.2d 495, 501 (1993) (analyzing the
battered child syndrome for the first time in Washington under the Frye standard); State v.
Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 899, 846 P.2d 502, 512 (1993) (applying the Frye standard to
evidence regarding the restricted fragment length polymorphism method of DNA typing). As
noted above, although the BWS was at one time a novel theory, currently it is not a novel
scientific concept. The Washington Supreme Court officially held this "novel" evidence was
admissible in 1984. State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984).
186. See, e.g., State v. Noltie, 116 Wash. 2d 831, 809 P.2d 190 (1991); State v. Lord, 117
Wash. 2d 829, 822 P.2d 117 (1991).
187. See Lord, 117 Wash. 2d at 850-51, 822 P.2d at 190-91.
188. 117 Wash. 2d 829, 822 P.2d 177.(1991).
189. 116 Wash. 2d 831, 809 P.2d 190 (1991).
190. 117 Wash. 2d at 854, 822 P.2d at 193. An epi-illumination microscope "utilizes a
microscope with illumination coming down from the side of the sample and reflected off the
sample, rather than passing light upward through the sample as regular microscopes do." Id. at
852, 822 P.2d at 191-92.
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expert used an epi-illumination microscope to examine paint and metal
chips that linked the defendant to a murder.191 Analyzing the Frye
question, the court could not point to any research, scientific or legal,
involving the epi-illumination microscope in this particular con-
text.192 Nonetheless, the court looked to the scientific acceptance of
the microscope in general and determined that using an epi-illumina-
tion microscope to examine paint and metal chips was valid.193
Under Frye, it was of no legal consequence that the microscope was
used in a new context because the microscope had already been found
scientifically valid.' 94
In State v. Noltie, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed a
court of appeals ruling, holding that expert testimony regarding
scientifically accepted colposcopy evidence was admissible in the novel
context of a child abuse case.' 95 In Noltie, the State's expert used a
colposcopy examination to determine whether or not a child had been
sexually abused.'96 Although using this technique was novel in the
child abuse context, the court held that the expert's testimony
regarding her use of a colposcope was admissible.' 97 The testimony
was admitted because colposcopy is a generally accepted technique for
discovering cancer and, thus, the requirements of Frye were met.' 98
For purposes of the Frye standard, it was of no legal significance that
this technique was applied in a "novel" set of circumstances.' 99
Thus, the Noltie decision illustrates that once a theory or procedure is
found to be generally accepted in the scientific community, in any
context, the Frye inquiry is complete.
Under both Lord and Noltie, the Riker majority should have
admitted Ms. Klingbeil's testimony regardless of the fact that
Deborah's situation presented the court with a novel context. The
BWS is a generally accepted scientific theory. BWS evidence has been
admitted in the context of battering within intimate relationships and,
thus, it need not undergo a Frye analysis when it is applied in the new
191. Id. at 849-50, 822 P.2d at 190.
192. Id. at 852, 822 P.2d at 191-92.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. 116 Wash. 2d at 850-51, 809 P.2d at 201-02 (afftrming State v. Noltie, 57 Wash. App.
21, 786 P.2d 332 (1990)). The court of appeals recognized that the colposcopy was a known
technique for discovering cancer and its use in child abuse cases was "relatively recent." 57
Wash. App. at 29, 786 P.2d at 336.
196. Noltie, 116 Wash. 2d at 850, 809 P.2d at 201.
197. 57 Wash. App. at 30-31, 786 P.2d at 336.
198. Id. at 29-30, 786 P.2d at 336.
199. See id.
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context in which the defendant is not currently in an intimate battering
relationship.
The court's obvious divergence from precedent in this case leads
to absurd results. The majority's analysis would require lower courts
to entertain a Frye analysis in every case where expert testimony is at
issue because all cases present differing factual contexts. This cannot
be what the Washington Supreme Court intended. If the court had
desired this result, it would have engaged in a Frye analysis in State v.
Ciskie,2 °° where the BWS was applied in a new factual context.20'
The Ciskie court, however, stated that a previous decision, State v.
Allery,2 °2 had already recognized the BWS as an accepted scientific
theory.0 3 Thus, it was not necessary to engage in a Frye analysis
more than once on the same scientific theory because the theory was
no longer novel. Under the Riker analysis, however, trial judges must
now undertake a Frye analysis every time a defendant raises the issue
of expert testimony. This is, to say the least, absurd.
2. The Majority Invaded the Jury's Province by Examining
the Expert's Conclusion
Even if the Frye analysis was applicable in Riker, the court
erroneously examined Ms. Klingbeil's conclusion, thereby flatly
ignoring its own precedent. In a Frye analysis, courts are prohibited
from examining an expert's conclusion.2°  Under Frye, the court is
concerned only with the existence of a phenomenon and the procedures
that experts rely on in reaching their conclusions. In fact, the
Washington Supreme Court has ruled that once a theory gains the
appropriate scientific recognition, the weight to be given the expert's
conclusion is left to the jury.203
Ms. Klingbeil is a well-established expert diagnostician of battered
women.20 6  She evaluated Deborah using scientifically accepted
techniques and was quite confident that Deborah was a battered
woman. Despite the fact that this testimony is legally sufficient to pass
200. 110 Wash. 2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988).
201. Id. at 265, 751 P.2d at 1166 (allowing the State to introduce BWS evidence to explain
a rape victim's failure to report the incident).
202. 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
203. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d at 271, 751 P.2d at 1170.
204. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 898-99, 846 P.2d at 511; see also Lord, 117 Wash. 2d at
854-55, 822 P.2d at 193.
205. See Lord, 117 Wash. 2d at 854, 822 P.2d at 192-93.
206. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d at 595-96, 682 P.2d at 315.
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Frye, the court examined the conclusion, stating it amounted "to no
more than an unsupported guess. "207
Even if the majority did not believe that Deborah was a battered
woman or that Ms. Klingbeil could properly evaluate Deborah under
these circumstances, the fact that a scientific procedure might yield
false results does not render the expert's conclusion inadmissible. 20 8
Any problems associated with testing procedures go to their weight,
not their admissibility.20 9 In fact, if an expert couches her testimony
in terms of "could have" or "possible," if she is relying on valid
scientific techniques, her testimony must be admitted. 210  The court
should have admitted this testimony because any doubts regarding
Deborah Riker's status as a battered woman could be explored on
cross-examination, or argued to the jury.1  Thus, the court's
examination of Ms. Klingbeil's conclusion is an unprecedented invasion
of the jury's province.
Not only is the court's inquiry entirely inappropriate under Frye,
this attack on the expert's conclusion was based on the apparent lack
of studies documenting the effects of prior battering on a person's
behaviors and reactions outside an intimate relationship. As extensive-
ly noted in Part II, the very studies the court cites document the
battered woman's ability to perceive danger and accurately assess this
danger.212
3. The Court Misinterpreted the Research on the
Battered Woman Syndrome
In reaching its decision, the court cited exclusively to Dr.
Walker's research and determined that her studies did not document
the effects that prior battering relationships would have on a woman's
207. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 364, 869 P.2d at 50.
208. State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 51, 882 P.2d 747, 766-67 (1994) (quoting and
affirming the trial court decision).
209. Id.
210. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d at 853, 822 P.2d at 192. In Lord, the defendant argued that an
expert's conclusion that trace evidence "could have" shared a common source was unreliable and
therefore inadmissible under Frye. Id. The court firmly rejected this argument because the
methods and techniques used in reaching this conclusion were generally accepted; therefore, the
proper weight to be given to her conclusion was left to the jury. Id.
211. Id.
212. Letter from Lenore Walker (Mar. 24, 1995), supra note 79. Dr. Walker opines that
"tilt would be expected that someone with BWS would be more hypervigilant-more likely to
accurately perceive danger at an earlier point-with less obvious cues-than someone who hadn't
been abused or developed BWS." Id. See also Walker, supra note 5, at 333 (explaining that"most battered women are more sensitive than the non-battered woman in perceiving the
imminent danger to which they respond").
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behaviors outside these relationships.213 In Riker, the court was
troubled by the fact that Dr. Walker's research was limited to
situations involving either a husband or boyfriend who battered either
a wife or girlfriend.214 Because Deborah and Burke did not fit the
traditional scenario in Dr. Walker's research, the court held that BWS
testimony was not "scientifically accepted"21  in this context.
However, the court ignored that Dr. Walker's research examined the
effects of battering, regardless of whether the woman was currently in
a battering relationship. 16 The court misinterpreted Ms. Walker's
research on the BWS.
First, the court's assertion that there were no studies involving the
BWS in a context where the battered woman and the male figure were
not intimately involved is directly controverted by the original research
on the issue.217 As stated earlier, only twenty-four percent of the 435
women in Dr. Walker's study were involved in an intimate, battering
relationship at the time of the study. The remaining seventy-six
percent of these women were previously exposed to battering relation-
ships but were not in a battering relationship at the time of the
study.21 However, this fact did not alter their status as battered
women:21 9 The BWS assumes only the existence of an intimate
relationship at some point in the battered woman's life.
Further, Dr. Walker's research supports the conclusion that a
battered woman manifests effects of the BWS even when she is out of
the battering relationship.220 Dr. Walker determined that battered
women are acutely aware of their surroundings and exhibit instinctual
behavior in response to any cues of danger, not just those from her
batterer 21 Thus, the dissent correctly pointed out that the nature
of Deborah's relationship with Burke was immaterial because the only
issue was the effect of Deborah's prior abuse on her current percep-
tions.222
213. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 364, 869 P.2d at 49-50.
214. Id. at 363, 869 P.2d at 50.
215. Id.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 65-80.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 50-80.
218. SYNDROME, supra note 50, at 1.
219. Letter from Lenore Walker (Mar. 24, 1995), supra note 79.
220. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 50-80.
221. Letter from Lenore Walker (Mar. 24, 1995), supra note 79; see supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
222. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 372, 869 P.2d at 54.
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The court's misinterpretations, however, did not end with Dr.
Walker's research. With its desired outcome firmly in mind, the court
went on to misapply ER 702.
C. The Riker Court Misapplied ER 702
The Riker majority declined to entertain the traditional analysis
used in BWS cases 223 to determine whether or not Ms. Klingbeil's
testimony was helpful to the trier of fact. Instead, the court fashioned
a new rule to determine if BWS evidence passes ER 702.224 The
court's desire to disallow BWS evidence in the Riker case was firm
indeed. Had the court engaged in the correct analysis under ER 702,
as Washington law requires, the testimony would have been admitted.
1. The Riker Court Created a New Standard
Although the Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
relevant evidence under part two of ER 702 need only be helpful in
assisting the jury to understand the evidence,23 the Riker majority
did not follow its own mandate. Instead, the court, without citing any
authority, fashioned a new, more stringent analysis derived from a
Nebraska jurisdiction.22 6  Relying on the test set forth in State v.
Reynolds,227 the court intimated that in Washington, relevance will
now depend on (1) "the court's evaluation of the state of knowledge
presently existing about the subject of the proposed testimony," and
(2) "the court's appraisal of the facts of the case." 228 The court then
determined, under this new standard, that "there was an inadequate
foundation for establishing the probative value of the [BWS] outside
of a battering relationship," and, therefore, the testimony was
inadmissible.229
This new standard evidences the court's desire to make it difficult
for certain battered women defendants to support their defenses. Until
Riker, no Washington court had deviated from the traditional inquiry
under ER 702, which requires only that the testimony be helpful to the
223. See, e.g., State v. Hanson, 58 Wash. App. 504, 793 P.2d 1001 (1990); State v. Ciskie,
110 Wash. 2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988); State v. Alery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312
(1984).
224. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 364, 869 P.2d at 50.
225. See Allevy, 101 Wash. 2d at 591, 682 P.2d at 312; Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d at 272, 751
P.2d at 1170; State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 220, 850 P.2d 495, 495 (1993).
226. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 364, 869 P.2d at 50.
227. 457 N.W.2d 405, 419 (Neb. 1990).
228. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 364, 869 P.2d at 50.
229. Id.
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trier of fact.23° Undoubtedly, battered woman defendants will have
a difficult time introducing expert testimony under prong one of this
new test.
Indeed, the supreme court created several problems by adopting
this test. First, this new standard leaves trial judges with no precedent
to guide their decisions to admit or exclude evidence. Similarly,
appellate courts have no precedent to apply in determining whether
trial judges have abused their discretion. This will undoubtedly lead
to unpredictable decisions. Second, allowing trial courts to determine
the relevance of expert testimony based on an "appraisal of the facts of
the case" allows courts unfettered discretion. In short, this standard
gives judges an open invitation to exclude testimony merely because
they disbelieve the defendant or find the facts of her case dubious.
The supreme court has now created uncertainty regarding the
proper analysis courts are to undertake when determining the
admissibility of expert testimony under ER 702. This uncertainty
creates unanswered questions. Under Riker, do courts forego the
traditional ER 702 analysis altogether? Is this new standard applicable
only in duress cases or only to battered women defendants like
Deborah? What is clear from this unprecedented legal leap to an
obscure rule from another jurisdiction is that the Washington Supreme
Court simply wanted to avoid its own rule. Had the court applied the
traditional, proper analysis under ER 702, Ms. Klingbeil's testimony
would have been admitted.
2. Had the Riker Court Applied the Correct 702 Analysis,
Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony Would Be
Admissible in Duress Cases
Traditionally, the two-step analysis under ER 702 requires only
that (1) the witness qualify as an expert, and (2) the testimony be
helpful to the trier of fact.'31 In determining whether or not testimo-
ny is helpful, courts examine the reasons why the defendant offered the
testimony and the relevance of the testimony in light of those
reasons." 2 In Riker, the parties stipulated to Ms. Klingbeil's qualifi-
cations as an expert, so the first prong was not at issue.233 Under the
second prong, Ms. Klingbeil's testimony should have been admitted
230. See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
231. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 890, 846 P.2d 502, 507 (1993).
232. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 364-65, 869 P.2d at 50.
233. Id. at 364, 869 P.2d at 50.
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because this testimony would have aided the jury in determining issues
of fact in Deborah Riker's case.
Washington courts allow defendants to introduce BWS testimony
to support a self-defense claim,23 4 yet the Riker court refused to
extend this privilege to a duress case.23 In comparing self-defense
and duress, it is clear that BWS testimony in duress cases is helpful to
the trier of fact because (1) self-defense and duress are similar defenses,
and (2) self-defense and duress are based on similar rationales.
a. Self-Defense and Duress are Similar Defenses
1. Similar Characteristics
In Washington, both duress and self-defense are statutorily
defined.236 The similarities between these defenses are evident when
the statutes are compared. The Washington duress statute requires
proof of four basic elements: (1) that the defendant was compelled to
commit a crime under threat, (2) that this threat created a subjective
fear of immediate death or grievous bodily injury, (3) that such fear was
reasonable, and (4) that the actor would not have committed the crime
but for the duress involved. 237  A defendant claiming self-defense
must prove similar elements. Under Washington's self-defense statute,
homicide is justified when, "[iun the lawful defense of the slayer....
there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the
person slain ... to do some great personal injury to the slayer ... and
there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. 238
The duress and self-defense statutes have similar characteristics.
Both defenses require the defendant to have a subjective fear of bodily
234. See, e.g., State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
235. 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994). Courts and legislatures in several other
jurisdictions have admitted BWS testimony where the defendant claims a duress defense. See,
e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 1995) (providing that BWS evidence is admissible in any
criminal case); United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894 (1992) (determining that BWS evidence
is relevant to sentencing where the defendant daims duress, thus refusing to disturb the trial
court's decision to admit expert testimony regarding the BWS); People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr.
2d 332 (Cal. App. 1992) (holding that if BWS testimony is relevant in self-defense cases, it is a
fortiori relevant to support a defense of duress), rev'd on other grounds, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994);
McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992) (holding BWS testimony admissible in duress
cases). The McMaugh court actually held that the BWS is an affirmative defense.
236. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.050 (1995) (self-defense); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.16.060 (1995) (duress).
237. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.060 (1995) (emphasis added). Jurors are also required
to consider whether or not the defendant had the ability to avoid the harm. State v. Turner, 42
Wash. App. 242, 246, 711 P.2d 353, 355 (1985).
238. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.050(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
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harm,239 and they both require that this fear be objectively reason-
able.240 Similarly, the standards for interpreting these defenses are
the same. Under the subjective components of both self-defense and
duress, jurors evaluate the defendant's actions based on an assessment
of all the circumstances. 241 In addition, with both defenses, the issue
of whether the defendant perceived fear under either of these compo-
nents is strictly for the jury to decide.242
Although there are differences between duress and self-defense,
these differences are minimal. The primary distinctions are as follows:
(1) the fear of injury in duress must be "immediate," while the fear of
injury in self-defense must be "imminent"; 243 and (2) the defendant
acting under duress directs her conduct toward a third party, while the
defendant acting in self-defense directs her conduct toward the person
putting her in fear.244 In addition, although a defendant may claim
self-defense to a charge of murder, the duress statute precludes a
defendant from claiming the defense in a charge of manslaughter or
murder. 245 Lastly, unlike self-defense, the duress defense is unavail-
able to one who recklessly places herself in a situation in which it is
probable she will be subject to duress. 246
These dissimilarities, however, are not controlling in the context
of admitting BWS testimony. Under both defenses, a juror must
assess whether the defendant honestly believed she was in "immediate"
or "imminent" danger, and whether the defendant's fear of danger was
reasonable. 247  Thus, under both defenses, a defendant's credibility
and state of mind will be placed directly before the jury.248 Further-
more, under both defenses, the jury must apply the same standards in
239. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.16.050, .060 (1995); see also State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d
220, 238, 850 P.2d 495, 504 (1993) (explaining the self-defense standard in the context of the
battered child syndrome).
240. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.16.050, .060 (1995); see also Janes, 121 Wash. 2d at 238, 850
P.2d at 504 (discussing the objective portion of the self-defense statute).
241. Turner, 42 Wash. App. at 246-47, 711 P.2d at 355 (duress); Janes, 121 Wash. 2d at
238, 850 P.2d at 504 (self-defense).
242. Turner, 42 Wash. App. at 245, 711 P.2d at 355 (duress); Janes, 121 Wash. 2d at 238,
850 P.2d at 504 (self-defense).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 239-240.
244. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
199, 235 (1982).
245. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.060(c)(2) (1995).
246. Id. § 9A.16.060.
247. Id. §§ 9A.16.050, 060.
248. See Boland, supra note 48, at 613-14.
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evaluating the defendant's actions.249 Thus, duress and self-defense
are almost identical in many important respects.
2. Similar Rationales
The Riker majority incorrectly opined that, as a matter of public
policy, the duress defense should be limited.50 This opinion mis-
states the current debate on the issue. Not only do scholars debate the
rationales of both duress and self-defense, 2t but the majority's
position fails to consider that the principles of deterrence and rehabili-
tation in the context of battered women are identical for both self-
defense and duress.
Generally, there are two theories that explain the rationales behind
self-defense and duress: justification and excuse.252  "Justified con-
duct is correct behavior which is encouraged or at least tolerated. 253
Under this theory, although the defendant has the mental state that the
crime requires and the defendant commits the act, she is justified
because she avoided a harm of greater magnitude.2 4 In contrast, a
defendant is excused, even though her deed may be wrong, "because
conditions suggest that the actor is not responsible for [her] deed. 25
Society deems this conduct undesirable, but it is inappropriate to
sanction the actor because she is not blameworthy. Rather, the
situation itself is to blame.5 6
Several scholars disagree on the underlying rationale for duress.
The two most notable authorities in favor of classifying duress as a
justification are Wayne LaFave and Austin Scott. 27  In arguing that
duress is justified conduct, these scholars state the following rationale
249. See supra text accompanying note 241.
250. 123 Wash. 2d at 366-67, 869 P.2d at 51.
251. Compare Robinson, supra note 244, at 226 (viewing duress as an excuse) with WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 433 (2d ed. 1986) (viewing duress as
a justification).
252. See infra text accompanying notes 253-267.
253. Robinson, supra note 244, at 229. Here, the focus is on the act done, not the actor.
254. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 251, at 433.
255. Robinson, supra note 244, at 221 (stating that "excuses admit that the deed may be
wrong, but excuse the actor because conditions suggest that the actor is not responsible for his
deed").
256. Id. at 229. The appropriate focus here is on the actor (acts are justified, actors are
excused).
257. Finkelstein, supra note 180, at 257. Additionally, Glanville Williams and Jeremy
Bentham support this approach, while the criminal codes of four states specifically treat the duress
defense as a justification. Id. But see Robinson, supra note 244, at 222. Paul Robinson dassifies
duress as an excuse because the actor is unable to control her conduct due to the conditions
imposed upon her. Id.
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for the defense of duress: "For reasons of social policy, it is better that
the defendant, faced with a choice of evils, choose to do the lesser evil
(violate the criminal law) in order to avoid the greater evil threatened
by the other person."2 ' This is particularly important in cases
where battered women claim duress and choose to commit the crime
because the greater evil they may face is death.2"9
Although the rationales of excuse and justification manifest some
differences, these distinctions are unimportant because both rationales
serve the same purpose. In either situation, the defendant is not
culpable. Conduct that is justified is not deterrable conduct because
there is nothing to condemn or punish.26° Similarly, an actor who is
excused or justified in her conduct is not necessarily going to be
rehabilitated because punishing a blameless person weakens the
rehabilitation function.26'
In Riker, the majority classified duress as an excuse, stating that
society wishes to place limitations on the duress defense.262 The
court did so even though this classification is contrary to the opinions
of these scholars and even though two Washington cases have stated
that duress can be classified as either an excuse or justification.263
In holding that duress and self-defense do not serve the same
policies, the court also ignored the principles of punishment. It is of
no legal consequence whether one views the duress defense as an
excuse or justification because under either position the defendant is
258. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 251, at 433.
259. See Clifford D. May, Editorial: Science v. Advocacy: Battered Women's Advocate Raises
Eyebrows Over Role in Simpson Case, ROCKY MTN NEWS, Feb. 5, 1995, at 84A, available in
Westlaw, 1995 WL 3169599. Lenore Walker states:
If you took a group of battered women and a group of non-battered women, the group
of battered women would be at higher risk to be killed by their partners. But that risk
would be very low. Conservatively, 2.5 million women in America are battered every
year. Between 1,200 and 4,000 of them are killed, a small percentage. And even
though we know there is a risk, what you can't do is go backwards and say which
woman will be killed or which partner will be the one to kill.
Id. See also State v. Hulltz, 838 P.2d 1257, 1261 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "[i]n
1990, fifty percent of female murder victims in Alaska were killed by their husbands or
boyfriends," quoting COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, ANNUAL
REPORT TO GOVERNOR HICKEL AND THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE 2 (March 1992)); Walker,
supra note 5, at 332 (stating that "it is not unusual for the abuse to escalate to homicidal propor-
tions after tl~e separation and during the divorcing period").
260. Robinson, supra note 244, at 245.
261. Id. at 247. This author believes excuses do serve the goals of special deterrence and
rehabilitation.
262. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 365 n.4, 869 P.2d at 51 n.4 (citing Robinson, supra note 244,
at 226, who describes duress as an excuse).
263. Id. The two Washington cases referred to are State v. Davis, 27 Wash. App. 498, 508,
618 P.2d 1034, 1039 (1980) and State v. Bromley, 72 Wash. 2d 150, 432 P.2d 568 (1967).
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not punished.2' 6 In other words, under either position, the defendant
cannot be rehabilitated or deterred.265 If we cannot deter someone
who, while acting in self-defense saves her life and takes that of
another, how can an individual who commits a crime while under
threat be deterred from "perceiving immediate harm"? If, while
holding a gun to B's head, A tells B that he will kill her if she does not
sell him a pound of cocaine, is B going to try to locate cocaine? The
point is that B is in fear for her life because A has threatened her. The
only issue is whether or not the threat is immediate. Neither society,
nor the legislature, nor the Washington Supreme Court can deter one
from being in fear and committing a crime when one is threatened with
her life.
c. Where Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony is Admitted in Self-
Defense Cases, it Should Be Admitted in Duress Cases
Applying the foregoing principles and discussion to the Riker case,
BWS testimony would have been helpful to the trier of fact in
assessing Deborah's defense of duress. As in a self-defense case, expert
testimony was crucial because Deborah's state of mind was at issue.
In evaluating her duress defense, jurors were asked to address two
questions: (1) Was Deborah Riker honestly in fear of immediate
harm?; and (2) Was this fear reasonable? Unfortunately, without any
BWS testimony, there was nothing to distinguish Deborah's percep-
tions from those of any other person.
Without BWS evidence presented through an expert, jurors could
not assess the subjective and objective components of duress. The
subjective component could not be accurately evaluated because there
was not enough information to determine whether Deborah honestly
perceived Burke's threats as putting her in immediate harm. Only if
an expert testified would jurors know that battered women are
hypervigilant to any cues of danger and that these women accurately
perceive these cues faster than do lay persons. 66 This testimony
264. Robinson, supra note 244, at 245.
265. Id. at 247.
266. See supra text accompanying note 77. In People v. Aris, the court, in paraphrasing Dr.
Walker's testimony, stated that "[a] woman who has been battered and then is threatened with
more abuse is more likely to perceive the danger involved faster that [sic] one who has not been
abused. The battered woman accurately senses when an abusive episode is not yet over." 264
Cal. Rptr. 167, 177 (Ct. App, 1989). Describing a battered woman's hypervigilance to any cues
of danger, Walker further testified that battered women perceive danger very honestly and much
faster than someone who has not been battered. Id.
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would support Deborah's theory that she perceived an immediate
threat.
Similarly, the objective component could not be properly evaluated
within the standards jurors are required to apply. How can a juror,
knowing nothing of the BWS, determine what the reasonable battered
woman would have done in Deborah's situation? Indeed, without
expert testimony, threats such as, "You will know the consequences!"
seem vague and innocuous. But the issue is not what we as lay
persons deem reasonable. The issue is what a battered woman,
knowing all she knows and seeing all she sees, would have done.267
Thus, there are no persuasive reasons why BWS testimony should not
be admitted in cases of duress when such evidence is admitted in self-
defense cases.
The exclusion of BWS evidence in Riker was unfairly prejudicial.
The widely held misconceptions regarding the BWS are well noted.
They exist whether the defendant claims self-defense or duress.
Without education regarding the psychological symptoms battered
women manifest and the impact of violence on these women's lives, the
jury may not have believed Deborah's testimony.
VI. CONCLUSION
The highest court in Washington State, in State v. Riker,
propounded a rule that is both counter-intuitive in theory and contrary
to the policy behind the admissibility of expert testimony. The court
determined, in effect, that certain battered women do not deserve the
benefit of legal precedent. The court implicitly stated that because
some testimony and some syndromes have the potential to be abused,
the courts must, however arbitrarily, prevent the floodgates from being
"thrown open to every conceivable emotional trauma.'"268 Yet
battered women defendants like Deborah are harmed in the process.
Although society must be on guard for unwarranted application
of a syndrome in order to escape criminal culpability, in a case like
Deborah Riker's, there is no danger of this happening. Allowing jurors
to hear expert testimony on the BWS does not mean they will
automatically acquit the defendant. The admission of this evidence
may have had no consequence on Deborah's verdict. Nevertheless, the
jury has a defined role in American jurisprudence and this role must
not be invaded. It is the jury's province to decide whether BWS
evidence should form the basis for an acquittal.
267. See supra text accompanying note 111-115 and notes 239-249.
268. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 366 n.5, 869 P.2d at 51 n.5.
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The Riker court limited application of the BWS to a narrow set
of circumstances by adopting a rigid rule of law from Nebraska,
without any authority for doing so. Unless this new rule is limited to
the Riker case, this new application of ER 702 will pose significant
hurdles for other types of expert testimony.
If the court does not wish to admit BWS evidence when a
defendant asserts a duress defense, as was clearly the case in Riker,
then at the very least, the court must reach its conclusion by using the
proper expert testimony analysis and adhering to its own precedent.
Unfortunately, the Riker court did neither of these things. The Frye
standard was not properly analyzed and prior Washington precedent
was either flatly ignored or directly controverted.
